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A case  against  the contemporary  taxonomy of  views on the  metaphysics  of  freedom.  
Berkeley's account of free will and agency.
Contemporary  philosophers  usually  approach  the  notion  of  freedom  by  the  distinction 
between freedom of choice and freedom of action. The implicit assumption is that, although 
freedom concerns both willing and acting, the kind of freedom involved in volitions is an 
essentially  different  thing  from  the  kind  of  freedom  involved  in  actions.  Given  this 
difference in kind, it seems there is no need to treat the second in relation to the first. So, 
while some (few) philosophers traditionally focus their researches on the freedom of choice 
as the necessary condition for free acting, most contemporary theorists deal with freedom 
exclusively from the viewpoint of its possible explanatory role in agency (believing the 
attribution of freedom to human subjects substantially independent on the possession of a 
faculty as free will). 
The debate on freedom admits four basic views: 1) Libertarianism; 2) Hard Determinism; 
3) Compatibilism (or  Soft  Determinism); 4) Skepticism.  Since I  simply  aims at  briefly 
sketching the categories in the contemporary taxonomy of positions, I will not provide a 
detailed account for each of the views. Particularly, I will use a disjunctive formula in order 
to capture both those philosophers focusing on freedom of choice and those focusing on 
freedom of action. 
The libertarian theorist holds that a human subject is free if and only if either the subject's 
choices or the subject's actions are ultimately up to her1. This dependance of either choices 
or actions on the subject is characterized by two assumptions:
1 Chisholm (1964); Clarke (1993); Kane (1999); O'Connor (1995).
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a) the subject is the source of her choices or the subject is the source of her actions;
b) the subject is able to choose or act otherwise than what she actually does. 
Since the libertarian believes that she can make a case for the soundness of “(a) &(b)” as 
the right understanding of human willing or agency, the libertarian then adfirms that human 
subjects possess freedom. 
Contrary to this view, the hard determinist theorist holds that “(a) & (b)” fails to grasp the 
story about human freedom; since being determinism true, then (b) can not be the case. 
Indeed,  given  the  laws  of  nature  and  a  set  of  initial  conditions,  everything  should  be 
necessitated to occur by the preceding conditions (of the universe): therefore, neither the 
subject's  choices  nor  the  subject's  actions  can  ever  be  up  to  her2.  In  reason  of  this, 
Libertarianism  and  Hard  Determinism  reaveal  to  be  incompatible  positions:  if 
Libertarianism is true then Hard Determinism is false; if Hard Determinism is true then 
Libertarianism is false. 
Compatibilism challenges both libertarianism and hard determinism claiming that, since 
ordinary attributions of freedom to human subjects do not originate from considerations on 
the metaphysical frame of nature (being rather a matter of moral concern), the assumption 
of determinism does not prevent  that human subjects can consistently be understood as 
equipped with free will or as free agents3. The traditional compatibilist idea is that in order 
to understand freedom it simply suffices that (a) is true, leaving aside the validity of (b)4. 
2 Van Inwagen (1983).
3 Smart (1961); Strawson (1962).
4 Fischer (1994).
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According to compatibilism common sense attitude to moral responsibility confirms this 
idea.  Indeed, common sense reactions  to morally relevant actions  swing from blame to 
praise. This entails that ordinary attitudes toward these notions make sense just within a 
framework in which human beings are thought to be morally responsible for their actions. 
But to be morally responsible seems to imply that the subject of moral responsibility is free,  
that is, she has some kind of control over his actions. This kind of freedom is then simply 
understood in terms of responsibility for actions or control over these, independently on the 
possibility to do otherwise.
Finally, the skeptic theorists holds that, independently on which of the established views is 
true, neither of these actually grasps what freedom is. The skeptic point of departure is that  
“(a)  & (b)” expresses  the  common sense  intuition  of  freedom.  By  this  assumption  all 
theories result faulty. Suppose  Libertarianism is true: if this is the case, given (b), there 
would be no costraining  reasons for  the subject's  choices  or actions.  Therefore,  human 
subjects should appear determined to will or act by chanche rather than by freedom. On the 
contrary, suppose Hard Determinism is true. Then human subjects reveal to be not free. 
Finally, suppose Compatibilism is true: the common sense attitude to the assumption of (b) 
is rejected.  Then Compatibilism reveals to be problematic:  for a side the theory makes 
appeal to the common sense attitude towards moral responsibility, for the other the theory 
rejects the common sense intuition of freedom.
Now, although the contemporary debate appears very useful in order to clarify the notion of 
freedom and the metaphysical difficulties it involves, my position is that the problem of 
freedom resists such an assessment for two main substantive reasons (that is, reasons that 
get their explanatory value by grasping metaphysical features of freedom). 
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Firstly, the distinction between freedom of choice and freedom of action is at best pointless, 
at worst senseless:  prima facie a subject is free if and only she is metaphysically free to 
choose (as she likes); that is, if her choices are ultimately up to her (I do not mean that all  
choices of a subject should be up to her, but that at least the most important ones should be  
up to her). Indeed, suppose a human subject someway free to act but not free to will. Would 
anyone actually consider this subject free? I fear that the answer is  no, since there is no 
intellegible intuition by which the expression  free to act without being free to will  makes 
sense  when predicated  of  a  human subject.  On the  contrary,  suppose  a  subject  has  no 
chance to choose among different options: her behaviour is completely determined by the 
state of affairs she is experiencing. Moreover, suppose that subject has decided with no 
costraints to conform her will to the only action she can perform (for example, God appears 
to me and command me you shall follow my divine decrees from now on). Would anyone 
actually consider the subject not free in behaving as the situation determine her to act? I 
believe the answer is no again. Consider my example: if the being appearing to me is really 
God, I have no possibilities to resist Him (probably I could not face my fear, my anguish,  
my delight, my wonder); nonetheless, I would be free in my accepting His command (that 
is, my freedom would result happily conforming my will to His, even if I probably have not 
possibility to do otherwise). In reason of these considerations, I conclude that free agency is 
commonly understood simply as a practical consequence of a free volition: if an action 
freely flows from a free volition, than the action is free; if an action freely flows from a  
volitions that is not free, than the action is not free too.  
Secondly,  the  four  views  advanced  by  contemporary  theorists  do  not  cover  all  the 
theoretical positions concerning the notion of freedom. That's why: almost all contemporary 
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theories  move  from a  common  characterization  of  the  volition-forming  process  or  the 
action-production process that  do not grasp all the actual formations of volitions or the 
productions  of  actions.  Consequently,  those  theories  appealing  to  a  characterization  of 
volition-forming process or action-production process alternative to that endorsed by the 
positions (1), (2), (3), and (4), necessarily fall outside the set of theories on freedom defined 
by the union of positions (1), (2), (3), and (4). A very short justification for my claim. The 
common characterization of volition-forming process and action-production process can be 
spelt out by the conjunction of the following assumptions: 
c) The volition-forming process or the action-production process are to be referred 
only to the subject either of the volition or of the action (at least for those volitions or  
actions which are relevant for the attribution of freedom to the subject); 
d) The volition-forming process or the action-production process are linear processes; 
that is, processes where different reasons or causes count by their absolute weight or 
force in occurring either the volition or the action; 
e)  The  volition-forming  process  or  the  action-production  process  occur 
istantaneously.
Given the phenomenology of decision making, by which habits, aptitudes and inclinations 
often determine a subject to will or act in a certain way more unavoidably than the most 
forcefull  reasons  can,  assumptions  (c),  (d),  and  (e)  appear  really  problematic  to  hold. 
Volitions and actions don't seem to be always in control of the subject; nor the processes 
forming the ones or producing the others appear to be linear and instantaneous. 
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Therefore, “(c) & (d) & (e)” does not provide the only possible characterization of volitions 
and actions. My point is not to dismantle the adequacy of “(c) & (d) & (e)”: it is simply to 
reject the claim that this conjunction of assumptions covers all types of volition-forming 
process and action-production process theories. 
Consequently, if “(c) & (d) & (e)” reveals to be one among other characterizations for the 
volition-forming process  and the  action-production  process,  it  is  natural  to  expect  that 
theories not endorsing “(c) & (d) & (e)” will not fall under the set of theories of freedom 
defined by the union of (1), (2), (3), and (4). 
Now, my purpose in this paper is to provide reasons against the contemporary approach on 
freedom, in order to show that a more promising account than one or the other version of 
the positions (1), (2), (3), and (4) is necessary. Particularly, I will try to highlight that (C1) 
the  distinction  between  freedom  of  choice  and  freedom  of  action  does  not  grasp  any 
important feature of freedom (freedom being understood prima facie as freedom of choice) 
and that (C2) at least a relevant theory not endorsing “(c) & (d) & (e)” is philosophically 
available. I name this account of freedom, which is the one I favour, Theory of Procedural  
Agency (TPA). 
Although a positive defense of (C1) and (C2) plus ad hoc arguments against (1), (2), (3), and 
(4) is the most systematic way to proceed, I will go along a different path. The reason is 
simple: I construe my paper as a preliminary work, mainly directed to dismantle the air of 
completeness  and  self-confidence  that  the  contemporary  taxonomy  of  views  on  the 
metaphysics of freedom seems to have. To this end providing a case which does not fit the 
taxonomy better supply my intention as to (C2) than any other method. And since this case 
offers good reasons both in support of (C1) and against the soundness of “(c) & (d) & (e)”, I 
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believe my case to accomplish my preliminary task.
The case I argue for are Berkeley's considerations about free will and agency. My idea is 
that these considerations furnish an embryonic approach to TPA. This does not mean that 
Berkeley has developed a consistent and complete theory: I simply claim that his treatment 
of the topic provides the theorist with very insighful intuitions and arguments in order to 
rightly setting the notion of freedom. My paper is an endeavour to work out these intuitions 
and arguments into a preliminary version of TPA. 
In the first section of my paper I will present the context within which Berkeley treats the  
notion  of  freedom.  I  will  consider  just  arguments  from  Alciphron:  this  work  is  not 
addressed only to professional philosophers, rather aiming at a larger audience. For this 
reason the book presents philosophical topics as plain dialogues among learned men. As a 
consequence Berkeley takes pain to draw a general picture of the philosophical debate in 
his era. This picture shows adequately that, as to the topic of freedom, the philosophical 
debate in the eighteenth century was deeply in line with the traditional assumption of (C1). 
In the second section of my paper I will raise some criticisms against Berkeley's theory of 
free will. Particularly, I will show that in order to assume consistenly (C1) there's a need for 
a distinction among different kind of volitions. To this regard I claim that the assumption of 
a constitutive view of self knowledge would help. In section three I will explain Berkeley's  
claims  concerning  agency;  and  I  will  provide  a  logical  formulation  of  these  as  an 
embryonic version of TPA. I will show that the theory is a case in support of (C2) and that, 
given that, there are good reasons to reject “(c) & (d) & (e)”. Finally, in the last section, I  
will show some of the difficulties a berkeleian like TPA involves, claiming that a sound 
version of TPA should answer positively these difficulties.
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1.
In the seventh dialogue from Alciphron Berkeley deals at length with the topic of free will. 
The context of the discussion is the rationality of religion. The advocate of freethinking 
defends the claim that religion is “an unreasonable absurd thing” (Alc., VII.19, p. 258)5. 
The claim is formally the conclusion of a sequence of propositions:
Religion implies the worship of a God, which worship supposes rewards and punishment, 
which suppose merits and demerits, actions good and evil, and these suppose human liberty, a 
thing impossible: and consequently religion, a thing built thereon must be an unreasonable  
absurd thing (Alc., VII.19, p. 258).
Now,  despite  appearances,  the  sequence  of  propositions  does  not  represent  a  sound 
argument: although  Alciphron  lists them  stating  they  relate  the  one  to  the  other  by 
supposition,  this  relationship  appears  to  be  mostly  unclear.  Nonetheless,  I  believe  the 
sequence can be worked out into logical form, which makes explicit what remains mostly 
implicit.  In order to accomplish this task, the freethinker needs principles and premises. I 
think a set of one principle and three premises can do the work:
PRINCIPLE: Religion implies the worship of a God. 
PREMISE1: The worship of a God consists of actions performed in conformity with the  
5 I detailedly defend the claim that Berkeley does not misrepresent his adversaries' opinions in Bertini (2005).  
According to my reading, then, Alciphron is a good picture of philosophical debates in eighteenth century.
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content of religious beliefs.
PREMISE2: A creature truely worshipping a God achieves a reward by God.
PREMISE3: A creature worshipping a God deserves reward by God for her worship iff  
she can choose between acting in conformity or not with the content of her religious  
beliefs.
Berkeley’s spokesmen endorse the principle and the three premises. As to the PRINCIPLE: at 
the end of the fourth dialogue Alciphron criticisizes Christianity presuming that  religion  
and divine  worship  are  the  same  thing (identity  thesis).  Crito  answers  to  his  criticism 
without rejecting this identity thesis (Alc., IV.25, pp. 140-141). Furthermore, the sequence 
of propositions against the rationality of religion explicitly begins with the assumption of 
the PRINCIPLE. Euphranor’s answer, as Crito’s, does not reject the identity thesis. 
As to PREMISE1: Berkeley devotes the fifth dialogue of his book to argue for the claim that  
Christian faith induces mankind to practice virtues as charity or justice in accordance with 
the content of Christian principles. For example, at paragraph 14 Crito defends this view 
comparing Roman and British history. He says: 
an  indifferent  eye  may…  perceive  a  vein  of  charity  and  justice,  the  effect  of  Christian 
principles, run through the latter [the British history]; which, though not equally discernible 
in all parts, yet discloses itself sufficiently to make a wide difference upon the whole, in spite 
of the general appetites and passions of human nature, as well as of the particular hardness 
and roughness of the block (Alc., V.14, p. 154). 
9
As to  PREMISE2:  Berkeley believes that natural religion,  by the simple use of reason,  
adequately grasps the doctrines of Providence, of the immortality of the soul, and of a 
future  state  of  rewards  and punishments  (Alc.,  V.27,  p.  169).  Nonetheless,  men are 
rarely “swayed or governed by mere ratiocination”, being more aptly lead by faith in 
most affairs of life6.  Consequently, the revelation by God communicate saving truths 
in a manner appropriate to mankind (Alc., VI.8, pp. 194-195; Alc., VI.31, p. 232), i.e. 
as instructions for worship (Alc., VII.11, p. 249). Christian worship drives then men to 
their eternal salvation, that is, Christian worship is rewarded by God. 
Finally,  PREMISE3:  at  paragraphs  10 and 11 of  the  third dialogue,  Berkeley draws the 
image of a rational society of agents. According to the supposition, this society is like a  
city whose founder and monarch is God. Every agent conforms her will to the divine  
will,  concurring to the promotion of the general well-being of the whole. In order to 
enforce rational agents to obey the established laws, God provides incentives for good 
actions  and discouragements  for  evil  actions  by stipulating a  system of  rewards  and  
punishments7.  Now, all  this  makes sense only if  PREMISE3 is  assumed.  Indeed, first,  if 
God needs to enforce rational agents to obey the law, they evidently could do otherwise;  
second, if God provides incentives (and discouragements) to good (and evil) actions,  
God  rewards  those  agents  that,  having  the  possibility  to  perform evil  actions,  have  
nonetheless chosen to perform good ones (the contrary for the case of punishing). 
From the assumption of the principle and the three premises, the argument follows. The 
first  step  infers  the  consequences  from  the  three  premises  concerning  the  concept  of 
6 See Alc., VI.19, p. 211-212.
7 See Alc., III.10-11, pp. 104-105.
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worship:
I.a) From PREMISE1 and PREMISE2 follow that I.(1) a creature acting in conformity with  
the content of her religious beliefs achieves a reward by God;
I.b) from I.(1) and PREMISE3 follow that I.(2) a creature acting in conformity with her  
religious belief deserves a reward by God for her actions iff she can choose between  
acting in conformity or not with the content of her religious belief;
I.c) Now, be A an action. It seems evident that  if  a creature can choose between  
performing A or not performing A, that creature, having chosen to perform A, could  
have done otherwise;
I.d)  Consequently,  from  I.(2)  and  I.(c)  follows  that  I.(3)  a  creature  acting  in  
conformity with her religious belief deserves a reward by God for her actions iff she  
could do otherwise than what she actually does.
At  this  stage  the  freethinker  moves to  the  second step of  the  argument,  raising a  case 
against  the  notion  of  a  creature  having the  possibility  to  do  otherwise  than  what  she  
actually does. 
I.e) Since all in Nature is necessary determined, I.(4) no creature has the possibility  
to act in a different way from how she actually does. 
I.f)  Then,  the  concept  of  worship implies  a  puzzle.  Indeed,  if  I.(4)  is  true,  the 
condition required for deserving a reward from God, stated by I.(3), is impossible to 
satisfy. 
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I.g) Finally, consider the PRINCIPLE:  from Religion implies the worship of a God and 
the three premises follow that  Religion implies that a creature acting in conformity  
with her religious belief deserves a reward by God for her actions iff she could act in  
a different way from how she actually acts. Therefore, if I.(4) is true, it follows that 
Religion implies that, in order to deserve rewards, it is necessary the satisfaction of a  
condition that is not possible  to satisfy.  Since  requiring to satisfy  a condition,  in  
order to deserve rewards, that is not possible to satisfy appears to be a good candidate 
for the designatum of the expression “an unreasonable absurd thing”, it seems to me 
that Alciphron’s claim on religion is logically justified if I.(4) is true.
Now,  in  order  to  defend  the  argument  there's  a  need  for  an  understanding  of  I.(e), 
particularly the expression  necessary determined occurring in the premise to I.(4). I will 
reason in terms of hypotetical freedom and categorical freedom. 
Suppose that while I'm writing my paper at time tn, I think to move to my kitchen and take a 
glass of water. Clearly this is a kind of thing I'm able to do. Suppose further that  H is a 
proposition about  the complete  state  of  the world at  time  ti  (ti precedes  tn);  and  L  is  a 
proposition specifying the laws of nature that govern our world. Suppose that “H  &  L” 
implies that I will not go into my kitchen at time tn+1 for taking a glass of water. Actually, I 
decide not to go in my kitchen at time tn+1. What if I did it? According to D.Lewis, while I 
could have not done it (on pain of denying that I could have broken a law), I could have 
been able to do something such that, if I have done it, a law would have been broken8. This 
means  that  although  a  subject  can  not  actually  falsify  a  law  of  nature  breaking  its 
8 D.Lewis (1981).
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deterministic causal power, if the initial conditions of the world would have been different 
(remaining the laws of nature identical), at the time when in the actual world the subject  
performs action A, in the possible world with the different initial conditions she would have 
performed action B. Hypotetical freedom is the attribution to the subject of the potential 
ability to do something such that, if she did it, a law of nature would be broken. That is to  
say,  hypotetical  freedom  expresses  the  idea  that,  given  a  plurality  of  worlds  slightly 
different  for some intrinsic conditions  but identical as to the environment  a determined 
subject lives in, the subject performs A in a world, B in another, C in a further one, and so 
on. This capture the human tendency to hold that a subject is able to do otherwise than what 
she actually does.  
On the contrary suppose that at time tn+1 I stand up and I move to my kitchen for taking my 
glass of water. In this case I carry out my resolution against the implication by “H & L”. 
Consequently,  a  law  of  nature  would  be  broken  (naturally,  if  the  state  of  the  world 
expressed by H has occurred as H states,  H could not be falsified by event occuring after 
the  occurrence  of  the  state  of  the  world  expressed  by  H).  Categorical  freedom is  the 
attribution to the subject of the actual ability to do something such that, if she did it, a law 
of nature is broken. That is to say, categorical freedom expresses the idea that,  given a 
plurality of worlds slightly different for some intrinsic conditions but identical as to the 
environment a determined subject lives in, the subject performs A or B or C and so on in a 
world, A or B or C and so on in another, A or B or C and so on in a further one, and so on.  
This too capture the human tendency to hold that a subject is able to do otherwise than what  
she actually does.
Now, when Alciphron deduces I.(4) from the proposition that  All in Nature is necessary  
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determined he intends that, given that determinism is true, hypotetical freedom is irrelevant 
to human freedom. Indeed,  since the kind of freedom usually attributed to human subject is 
categorical freedom, saying that a certain human subject could have done otherwise than 
what she actually does if she has fallen under a different causal chain, does not change the 
fact that this human subject is determined to do exactly what she does in the actual world 
and what she would do in any possible other. Consequently, necessary determined can be 
defined in the following manner:
NECESSARY DETERMINED =def given a state of the actual world H occuring at time tn, and a 
state of the world H' occuring at time tn in a possible world, and a further state of the 
world H'' occuring at time tn in a further possible world, (and so on), and the laws of 
nature L;  X is necessary determined in the actual world iff “H & L” implies X at time 
tn+1 and X actually occurs at time tn+1, and X' is implied by “H' & L” at time tn+1 in a 
possible world and X'' is implied by “H'' & L” at time tn+1 in a further possible world, 
(and so on). 
In my opinion Alciphron's argument is a real challenge for Berkeley’s position. Because of 
the endorsement of the entire set of principle and premises of the argument, the only chance 
Berkeley  has  to  defend  Christianity  from  the  freethinker’s  attack  is  to  reject  I.(4). 
Furthermore, he does need to reply the freethinker’s attack: I.(4) appears to be a rebuttal of 
free will and the ascription of freedom to mankind is a foundational notion of the religion 
orientated conception of human existence Berkeley’s philosophy clearly aims at defending. 
Suppose, indeed, that I.(4) is true. From the assumption of a fourth premise follows another 
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claim:
PREMISE4:  if a creature has not the possibility to act in a different way from how she  
actually acts, that creature is not free to choose to act in a way or another9.
Thus:
I.h) From PREMISE4 it follows that if creatures do not have the possibility to act in a  
different way from how they actually act, then creatures are not free to choose to act  
in conformity with the content of their religious beliefs. 
I.i)  Suppose I.(4) to be true, it  follows that  men are not free to choose to act in  
conformity with the content of their religious beliefs.
I.j) But  if men are not free to choose to act in conformity with the content of their  
religious beliefs, the traditional religious attitude to life is senseless. 
By reason of this, Berkeley is forced at denying that I.(4) is true: his treatment of free will 
is mostly governed by the intention to defeat arguments such as Alciphron’s. Consequently, 
his doctrine of freedom depends on Alciphron’s understanding of the notion. 
9 The addition of the clause in a way or another to the criterion for freedom (to choose to act) could seem 
redundant. If a creature is free to choose to act, then that creature is free to choose to act in a way or another.  
Nonetheless  there  are  philosophical  reasons  to  prefer  the  apparently  redundant  formulation  of  PREMISE4. 
Suppose you promise something, e.g. you answer your child’s request for a toy saying him the day my salary  
will be pay I shall buy you a toy. In this case, the day your salary is at your disposal you can choose if keeping 
your word or not. But you have not any real possibility to act in a way or another: the range of your choice is  
indeed determined by buying the toy or not. That is to say, any other behaviour would be irrelevant to the 
situation:  it  is  not  an  option  for  the  case.  Therefore,  adding  the  clause  in  a  way  or  another intends 
distinguishes among two different approaches to freedom: freedom as choice to perform or not an action and 
freedom as choice to act between a set of different possibilities. 
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A very brief survey of the freethinker’s view: he provides three arguments against freedom, 
mainly drawn from freethinking literature10. The first argument infers from the universal 
applicability  of  the  laws  of  motion  that  all  wordly  occurrences  are  mechanically 
determined. Being mental events caused by wordly occurrences, mental events as volitions 
result determined too. The second argument infers from the evidence that volitions follow 
from moral  judgements,  that  the  mind  is  determined  to  will  what  it  wills  from causes 
external to the sphere of volition. The third argument infers from God’s omniscience that 
every event is a priori determined (if such and such cases will surely happen, then there are 
no contigent events). 
It  is  evident  that  these arguments  can not  demonstrate  I.(4).  They simply conclude the 
trivial proposition that any determinate being subsists attending some others determinate 
beings, without asserting any clause about the nature of determination. Thus, in order to 
achieve  a  demonstration  for  the  claim that  no creature  has  the  possibility  to  act  in  a  
different  way  from  how  she  actually  acts,  Alciphron  needs  a  principle  stipulating  the 
identity of determination and necessary determination.  The following principle does the 
work:
PRINCIPLE OF NECESSARY DETERMINATION (PND):  every  determination  is  necessary  
determined. 
That is,  according to the definition of  necessary determined, every actual determination 
10 Olscamp  (1970),  p.  91,  193  and  following;  Bertini  (2005),  pp.  42-44;  Brykman  (2009),  p.  332  and  
following; Harris (2009), p. 342-344.
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follows  from  a  given  state  of  the  world  and  the  laws  of  nature,  and  every  potential 
determination follows from states of the world of alternative possible worlds and the laws 
of nature.
In logical terms:
PND1: ∀x [P(x) ⊃ □P(x)]
PND2: ∀x,y (x R y) {{P(x) & [P(x) ⊃ Q(y)]} ⊃ □{P(x) & [P(x) ⊃ Q(y)]}}
The arguments then run as follows. Suppose  will stands for  y and the function  Q for a 
modification of the will, i.e. a volition. Since volitions are always causally related to states 
of the world, let x stands for a certain state of the world and R for a relationship of cause 
and effect. Alciphron argues for three different possibilities: 
α) the function P expresses a mechanical property inhering in x; 
β) the function P expresses a judgement whose content concerns x; 
γ) the function P expresses a knowledge by God whose content concerns x. 
In all these cases PND2 asserts that since the will and a certain state of the world are related, 
if a given modification of that state of world implying a determinate modification of the 
will (or a given modification of human or divine mind whose content concerns that state of 
the  world)  occurs,  volition  results  necessarily  determined.  Alciphron’s  task  consists 
therefore in providing reasons to relate volitions to modifications of determinate states of 
the  world  (or  to  modifications  of  human  or  divine  mind  whose  content  concerns 
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determinate states of the world) in order to prove that volitions don’t stem from free will, 
being these necessary effects of external causes. 
Berkeley’s strategy is to offer counterexamples to the adequacy of PND2  to capture the 
relationship between volitions and modifications of states of the world (or modifications of 
human or divine mind whose content concerns determinate states of the world). As to the 
first  argument,  Berkeley  refers  to  the  ontological  dualism of  extended and unextended 
things  in  order  to  dismantle  the  identification  of  P(x)  with  some  mechanical  class  of 
properties. Since objects belonging to the first group are completely different from those 
belonging to the second, there is  no way to establish a direct relationship among them 
(Berkeley’s  example  is  in  my opinion quite  unhappy:  triangles  and sounds).  Now, any 
mechanical class of properties falls under the group of extended things,  while volitions 
under unextended. Consequently, if P(x) ⊃ Q(y), under the premise that “x R y”, P(x) can 
not stand for any kind of mechanical class of properties. 
As to the second argument, Berkeley denies that judgements and volitions stay in a relation 
of implication, since judgements and volitions are one and the same operation of mind; 
therefore,  it  follows that phenomena related to  the relationship  between judgments  and 
volitions falls outside the extension of PND2.
As  to  the  third  argument,  Berkeley  argues  for  the  claim  that  while  the  conditional 
expressions recurring in the principle are formally true (if a knowledge by God whose  
content concerns a certain state of affairs occurs, then all minds experiencing that state of  
affairs will necessary enjoy those volitions God have foreseen), the premise “x R y” fails 
to  specify  a  causal  condition,  because  certainty  of  knowledge  is  an  epistemological 
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requirement while necessity of occurrence is an ontological commitment.
At this point the notion of freedom Berkeley’s spokesmen and their adversaries deal with 
seems sufficiently clear: freethinkers and religion apologists focus the entire discussion on 
the determination of volition. While the first group appears confident in being able to prove 
that any volition is necessary determined, the latter rejects all arguments in support of the 
claim without  denying that  being  free  is  being  free  to  will.  That  is  to  say,  Berkeley’s 
treatment of objections to the notion of freedom from freethinking literature highlights how 
matter at issue was informed by understanding freedom exclusively in terms of volition. In 
this  regard,  from a metaphysical point of view the agent’s will  is the only principle  by 
which accounting for agency. That’s why Euphranor judges free a man acting in conformity 
with his will. Since he supposes the will to be free, if an action flows directly from volition, 
i.e. if no external constraint prevents the agent from doing what she will, the action should 
be said free. On the contrary, since Alciphron supposes the will to be necessary determined, 
then the action flowing from volition couldn’t be actually free. Consequently, they both 
agree in defining freedom as correspondance of will and agency: 
FREEDOM1=def “A man is said to be free, so far forth as he can do what he will” (Alc. 
VII.22, p. 263).
FREEDOM2=def “Man acting according to his will, is to be accounted free” (Ibidem).
Although  both  definitions  appear  really  traditional,  the  debate  between  Berkeley's 
spokesmen  and  their  adversaries  is  very  instructive  as  to  the  identification  of  human 
freedom with freedom of choice. Indeed, their common assumption that determinism would 
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dismantle any attribution of freedom to mankind shows a substantive reason in support of 
claim as (C1). Given the understanding of determinism in terms of NECESSARY DETERMINED=def 
and PND2, human agency should appear the outcome of the states of the world and the laws 
of nature. Why does this conclusion challenge the idea that human being are free? After all 
it could be said that an agent acts freely whenever she acts with no external constraints, 
even if her actions are necessary determined. 
What makes this proposal unsatisfactory is the inconsistency between the notion of acting  
with no external constraints and  acting by being necessary determined  when applied to 
moral  agents as  human subjects  are  supposed to  be.  Indeed,  if  an agent  acts  by being 
necessary determined then her actions are the outcome of states of the world and the laws 
of nature. But if this is the case, the agent does not act with no external constraints. On the 
contrary,  if  the  agent  acts  with  no  external  constraints,  then her  actions  should appear 
determined  by  some  ability  to  perform  an  action  with  which  the  agent  is  essentially 
equipped.  That  is,  the  agent  should  acts  basically  in  reason  of  her  internal  principles. 
Therefore, conclusion follows: if determinism is true there is no possibility to reject the 
idea that every human subject is necessary determined to act by some kind of external 
constraints. 
Now, this conclusion makes the pair with the rejection of the idea that freedom could be 
attributed to human being, because human freedom is commonly meant to be the possibility 
to perform an action in reason of the agent ability to determine herself in acting11. The 
reduction of freedom to freedom of choice intervenes here: the will is the source of the 
agent's ability to determine herself to act, since an agent determining herself is an agent 
11 See Alc., VII.16, p. 262. 
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willing herself to behave in a certain manner. That is to say, the subject is not necessary 
determined by external constraints in acting because she has a special power to decide how 
to act and to actualize this resolution by self-determination: a subject free in doing what she 
does is an agent doing what she will and willing what she likes. 
A promising way to deploy this intuition is to say that to be free a human subject should 
possess immanent causal powers. According to R.Chisholm causal powers are divided into 
two main categories12:
… when one event or state of affairs (or set of events or states of affairs) causes some other 
event or state of affairs, then we have an instance of transeunt causation. ... when an agent, as 
distinguished from an event, causes an event or states of affairs, then we have an instance of 
immanent causation.
This distinction makes appeal to the phenomenal evidence that, although states of the world 
succeed the one to the other appearing causally chained in a train of events, human subjects 
seem to be endowed with a special, basic and irreducible power to start new chained trains 
of events.  Given that the world we live in appears a chain of transeunt causes, agency 
theorists (theorists attributing to human subject immanent causal powers) need to answer 
how immanent causation can work within a transeunt causation realm. The usual idea is to 
express immanent causation in terms of control of transeunt causation processes. 
Quoting Chisholm again:
12 Chisholm (1964), p. 30.
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The nature of what is intended by the expression immanent causation may be illustrated by 
this sentence from Aristotle's Physics: “thus, a staff moves a stone, and is moved by a hand, 
which is moved by a man” (VII.5.256a, 6-8)... We may say that the hand was moved by the 
man, but we may also say that the motion of the hand was caused by the motion of certain  
muscles; and we may say that the motion of the muscles was caused by certain events that 
took place within the brain. But some event, and presumably one of those that took place 
within the brain, was caused by the agent and not by other events.
Berkeley's  reference  to  self-determination  as  something  that  is  exercised  by  the  will 
provides a theoretical model for the explanation of human immanent causal powers. This 
model  characterizes  human  agency  as  the  production  of  “sighted  actions”,  namely, 
intentional  (or  orientated-by-the-will)  actions  the  agent  performes  with  some  goals  in 
mind13. That is to say: states of the world and the laws of nature determine events to occur. 
The agent experiences those events acquiring some packs of informations about her actual 
environment. Then the agent responds to the state of the world by deciding which purpose 
to pursue with her behaviour, that is, being directed towards the achievement of something 
she will.  Consequently,  human subjects  exercise control  over their  action by their  will, 
being in this way responsible for what they do.
In the light of this agreement between Berkeley's spokesmen and their adversaries it seems 
reasonable to expect that the relationship between freedom and the will gives Alciphron 
further refined reasons in support to his argument. Indeed, he requires further conditions for 
saying a man to be free: if the will is the principle accounting for agency, it seems plain to 
13 Muehlmann (1992), p. 78-97.
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claim that a man is free if and only if he is free to will what he will. According to the 
freethinker this means that the will is free if and only if the will is completely free to self-
determine a volition among (at least) a pair of alternative possibilities. He says:
In freedom there should be an indifference to either side of the question, a power to act or not 
to act,  without prescription or control:  and without this  indifference and this  power,  it  is 
evident the will cannot be free (Alc., VII.20, p. 260).
This requirement of indifference in choice means that, given FREEDOM1=def and FREEDOM2=def, 
according to the freethinker freedom can be attributed to human subject if and only if the 
following condition obtains: 
FREEDOM3=def a person is free to will in willing what he does iff he could have will  
otherwise.
It seems, then, that Alciphron assumes as the default option concerning free will a notion 
that  appears  to  be the  general  form of  what  H.G.Frankfurt  has  called the  Principle  of  
Alternate Possibilities (PAP)14:
PAP=def A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have  
done otherwise.
14 Frankfurt (1969), p. 829.
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Indeed,  given that  Alciphron and Euphranor  agree  on  the  claim that  the  attribution  of 
freedom to mankind implies that human subjects are agents provided with an immanent 
causal power they exercise by their will, according to both of them an agent is morally 
responsible for her actions if and only if the agent freely will the actions she performs. That 
is, under these common assumptions the notion of moral responsibility requires the notion 
of free will. 
Because of this, a stronger argument appears to be at Alciphron’s disposal. If the notion of 
freedom excludes any kind of determination in volition, he can express a very malicious 
doubt (Alc., VII.22, p. 263). Suppose a man to be free because of his acting in conformity 
with his will. Would he be really free to will what he wills? That is, would his will really be 
able  to self-determine the given volition choosing among (at  least) a pair of alternative 
possibilities? If the answers to these questions are negative, as Alciphron evidently holds, 
the supposition that the will is free to self-determine volitions would not suffice in order to 
defend  the  attribution  of  freedom to  mankind.  Indeed,  even  if  the  will  self-determines  
volitions, this self-determination could be necessary determined. All this is captured in my 
opinion by PND1: Alciphron’s doubt is then an evidence for its assumption.
Naturally, PND1 is a basic metaphysical principle, that is, a first evidence whose analisys 
prima facie can’t refer to more basic principles. Consequently, it results extremely difficult 
to  provide  a  conceptual  argument  against  PND1 without  assuming  some  experiential 
intuitions contrary to its content. In my opinion this is the main reason why Berkeley’s 
positive  argument  for  free  will  simply  appeals  to  the  inward  experience  of  volition, 
rejecting any intention to argue conceptually for it:
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If  I  should suppose things spiritual  to be corporeal,  or  refine things actual  and real  into  
general abstracted notions, or by metaphysical skill split things simple and individual into  
manifold parts, I do not know what may follow: but if I take things as they are, and ask any 
plain untutored man, whether he acts or is free in this or that particular action, he readily 
assents, and I as readily believe him from what I find within (Alc., VII.21, p. 262).
Now, in spite of Berkeley’s confidence in referring to commonsense intuitions, his claim 
seems to me really  puzzling.  If  moral agents are thought  to be free because they have 
immanent causal powers relying on their will, then Alciphron's requirements for attributing 
freedom  to  mankind  should  be  answered.  As  to  this,  Berkeley’s  claim  seems  to  me 
senseless: my “plain” experience, indeed, makes me believe I’m not usually free in willing 
what I will. That is to say, a vague reference to ordinary experience of the production of 
volitions by the will does not seem to provide a positive case in support to the claim that 
human beings are free.
II.
In order to explain why, I begin with mentioning some facts occuring to me when I was 
younger. After the fulfillment of my secondary studies, at the age of 18 I begin to smoke 
cigarettes. I’ve happily been a heavy smoker for a period of three years. I remember quite  
well  that I  didn’t  care about consequences nor I had particular problems with nicotine. 
When I was smoking, I simply felt a strong pleasure. Nonetheless, things began to change 
since after some times I had realized that I was completely cigarette addict. I came at this 
awareness because much of the cigarettes I smoked didn’t give me pleasure anymore, even 
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if some continued to satisfy me (the first in the morning, after lunch and dinner, the last 
before  sleeping).  Consequently,  I  tried  to  set  a  limit  to  my  smoking,  but  I  couldn’t. 
Although I really wanted to smoke just those cigarette that I desired, I can’t avoid smoking 
my usual quantities. Therefore, I took a resolution and I quit smoking. 
Now, I perfectly remember that during working hours I often had cigarette breaks. In the 
period of my empty efforts to limit my cigarettes, I didn’t like to smoke in those moments,  
but I smoked the same. Before lighting my cigarette I usually thought of all the unpleasant 
feelings I would have felt, but I finally decided to light it. It is worth noting that I didn’t do 
it suddenly. It was as if a part of me didn’t want to smoke, while another did. Since my act  
was the result  of my choice,  I’m inclined to think that  my will  produced a  volition to 
smoke.  Nonetheless,  I  felt  this  volition  as  something  which  does  not  belong  to  my 
volitional life, since it always went with another contrary volition (whose content was I do 
not want to smoke) that seems to me to express more properly what I did will. In such a 
case, I was sure that the force of these volitions was exactly the same: the fight was solved 
just by my habit to smoke. For this reason I can’t express myself differently than saying 
that I would have smoke without willing. 
In my opinion such situations are very common. Each of us, I claim, has experienced strong 
hesitations due to the will of performing two different and opposite actions, the first being 
the purpose of a compulsory volition, the second the purpose of a contrary volition which 
appears to express our actual will. When the first of them is performed, the feeling enjoyed 
by the agent is that she will without willing (or that she will without being free in willing). 
The main reason for this odd feeling is, I think, that in similar cases the moral conflict is 
mostly lead to its solution by custom or by chance, i.e. the performance of the action is not  
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determinated  by  the  will,  being  determined  by  something  external  the  opposition  of 
volitions. Consider the following situation: my will produces two opposite volitions, V1 and 
V2. I should making a choice among them. Nonetheless, neither of them prevails since they 
are  equally  compelling.  Consequently  I  can  not  choose  V1 nor  V2.  Suppose  I  finally 
determine myself to perform the action corresponding to the content of V1. Since V1 and V2 
have the same volitional force, the choice has occurred by means of motives other than the 
will.  Be these motives custom, chance or whateverelse:  since I  would both V1 and V2, 
performing the action corresponding to the content of V1 I must be said to have would the 
action I perform. Nonetheless, the action corresponding to the content of V1 hasn’t been 
freely  determined  by  the  will:  willing  the  action  has  been  determined  by  the  motive 
inclining me to perform it; which is the same with saying that the will is not always freely 
self-determined in willing15.
Phenomenal evidences of this kind raise a fundamental difficulty for a defense of human 
freedom moving from assumptions  as  (C1)  and  the  recourse  to  experiences  of  choices 
among different  possibilities  as  positive  cases  in  support  to  the freedom of  the  will  to 
determine itself. Indeed, consider the following argument: 
II.a) Given determinism, NECESSARY DETERMINED=def and PND2, it follows “FREEDOM1=def 
& FREEDOM2=def ”; that is, (C1) is the right understanding of human freedom;
II.b) Given “FREEDOM1=def & FREEDOM2=def”, it follows FREEDOM3=def; that is, since (C1) is 
15 It  is  worth  noting  that  evidence  in  support  of  my  claim  is  also  provided  by  experimental  works  in 
philosophy. Berman (2009), pp. 30-43, shows that, although the will seems free to oppose one determined 
volition concerning the satisfaction of a given desire, the suppressed volition returns periodically (and even 
unconsciously) to the mind. Since the mind does not want the suppressed volition, if the experiment works, at  
least in some cases of volition concerning determined desires it appears clear that the will is not free in self  
determine the content of its acts.
27
the  right  understanding of  human freedom,  then attribution  of  freedom to  human 
beings implies that human freedom should be free to  will;
II.c) Phenomenal evidences show that, at least for cases such as hesitations, human 
beings are not free to will.
According to the argument II.(a)-(c), phenomenal evidences provide counterexamples to 
the  claim that  human  beings  are  free to  will.  Naturally,  it  could  be  said that  (C1)  and 
FREEDOM3=def apply to those cases of human agency which are relevant to the attribution of 
freedom  to  mankind,  wheras  other  cases  of  human  agency,  e.g.  hesitations,  could 
consistently appear to be not free. Nonetheless, the argument could be refined in a way that 
it results almost unanswerable. 
Consider the reasons why Berkeley and the agency theorists make appeal to the notion of 
(free) will: if determinism is the whole story concerning the succession of states of the 
world, then the subject's actions are out of her control. But the attribution of freedom to a 
human subject implies that the human subject has some kind of control (or authorship) over 
her actions. (Free) will,  namely,  freedom of choice,  provides phenomenal  evidence that 
human subjects exercise control over their actions. Therefore, determinism is not the whole 
story concerning the succession of states of the world. 
In reason of this it appears evident that Berkeley and agency theorists resort to (free) will as 
a mean to exercise immanent causal power (to lead agent causation) on transeunt caused 
successions of states of the world (on event causation processes). Common examples of 
this  ability  concerns  ordinary situations  such as  performing different  kind of  particular  
28
actions16,  probabilistically deciding (by weighted motives between a pair of possibilities)  
how to spend time17; resolving moral conflict among opposing interests18. 
What if in all these situations the will would result determined by something other than 
itself? I have a strong inclination to hold that this matter stands as follows: the agency 
theorist's examples relate to situations where the subject need to choose among two or more 
(conflicting  or  non conflicting)  possibilities.  A gross  amount  of  classical  researches  by 
psychologists and sociologists attest that choice of this kind are mostly governed by habits, 
custom and compliance to the social role the subject play. Consequently, the phenomenal 
evidences  referred  to  in  II.(c)  can  be  justifiably  thought  a  subset  of  the  phenomenal 
evidences involved in every exercise of (free) will. The argument II.(a)-(c) is then to be 
reworked as follows:
II.d) Given determinism, NECESSARY DETERMINED=def and PND2, it follows “FREEDOM1=def 
& FREEDOM2=def ”; that is, (C1) is the right understanding of human freedom;
II.e) Given “FREEDOM1=def & FREEDOM2=def”, it follows FREEDOM3=def; that is, since (C1) is 
the right understanding of human freedom, then human beings should be free to will;
II.f) Agency theorists appeal to exercises of (free) will in choosing among two or 
more   (conflicting  or  non  conflicting)  possibilities  as  phenomenal  evidences  in 
support to the actual soundness of  FREEDOM3=def  in capturing the notion of human 
freedom;
II.g) Phenomenal evidences show that human beings are not determined by (free) will 
16 See Alc., VII.21, p. 262.
17 Clarke (1993), p. 195.
18 Kane (1999), p. 224 and following.
29
in choosing among two or more (conflicting or non conflicting) possibilities;
II.h) Human beings are not free to will.
Now, given that determinism, NECESSARY DETERMINED=def and PND2 does not seem prima facie  
negotiable and that, on these assumptions, the attribution of freedom to mankind requires 
(C1) to be valid, if a theorist aims at defending the attribution of freedom to mankind, then 
arguments as II.(d)-(h) should be dismantled.
In my opinion the most promising way to accomplish the task is to give an account of the 
will in terms of the constitutive theory of self-knowledge19: this approach allows to model 
volitional  events  relying  on  the  distinction  among  two  basic  sets  of  volitions;  which 
suffices to reject the conclusion II.(h).
Self-knowledge is the first person knowledge of one's mental states as beliefs, desires, and 
sensations. Constitutivism concerning self knowledge is the claim that having knowledge of  
one's first order mental states is at least a necessary condition for having those mental  
states (CSK). The main reasons in support of CSK are due to transparency (or immediacy) 
and authority. Suppose a subject has self knowledge that she believes that P. What does this 
mean?  The  natural  answer  is  that  she  believes  that  P.  Transparency  (or  immediacy) 
captures the idea that self knowledge of one's first order mental states necessary goes with 
(is one and the same with) the occurence of those first order mental states. Suppose further 
that someone asks that subject how can I say that you believe that P?. The subject should 
answer  you can say that I believe that P since I testify to you that I do believe that P. 
Authority grasps the idea that, given a mature and healthy subject, self knowledge of one's 
19 See Coliva (2009).
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first order mental states is justified by the first person enjoyment of those mental states.
The  main  problems  for  the  assumptions  of  CSK relate  to  two  classes  of  phenomenal 
evidences that provide counterexamples to the adequacy of CSK. The first class consists in 
unconscious mental states; the second in the purposive behaviours of animals lacking self 
knowledge.  Both  of  these  classes  of  phenomenal  evidences  address  to  CSK the  same 
charge:  at  least  basic  mental  states  as  beliefs,  desires,  and  sensations  possibly  occur  
independently on having knowledge of them.
The constitutive account of self knowledge rejects the objection from unconscious mental 
state and purposive behaviour introducing the distinction between beliefs as commitments  
and  beliefs as dispositions.  The first  are  judgement-sensitive:  they express propositional 
knowledge, which commits the subject of belief to hold responsibly proposition as I believe  
that P. The second are non-judgement-sensitive: they express non propositional knowledge, 
which does not commit the subject of belief to hold responsibly proposition as  I believe  
that P, even if they dispose her to act in conformity to such a belief. Unconscious mental 
states and purposive behaviour are related to the field of application of the notion of beliefs 
as dispositions, while CSK applies to beliefs as commitments. 
Let's now turn to the will and volitions. My proposal is to deal with willing as a particular 
mental state falling under the extension of CSK. Prima facie it seems extremely reasonable, 
since both transparency and authority appear to be properties of volitional mental states. 
Indeed, having knowledge of one's will (or volitions so and so) necessary goes with (is one 
and the same with) the enjoyment of one's will (or volitions so and so). And again,  self 
knowledge of one's will (or volitions so and so) is justified by the first person enjoyment of 
one's will (or volitions so and so). Consequently, it can be said having knowledge of one's  
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will (or volitions so and so) is at  least a necessary condition for having one's will (or  
volitions so and so).
In  order  to  answer  the  counterexamples  that  hesitations,  conflicting  volitions  and  non 
conflicting volitions provide to the claim that human beings are free to will, I parallel the 
distinction  between  beliefs  as  commitments  and  beliefs  as  dispositions  in  relation  to 
volitions. I say that volitions as commitments are judgement-sensitive volitions expressing 
propositional knowledge such that, if a subject enjoys a given volition of this kind, then she 
holds responsibly proposition as  I will so and so. And again, volitions as dispositions are 
non-judgement-sensitive volitions expressing non propositional knowledge such that, if a 
subject enjoys a given volition of this kind, then she does not hold responsibly proposition 
as I will so and so, even if she results to be disposed to act in conformity to such a volition. 
It seems to me that this approach defeats the argument II.(d)-(h). This is how I see the story: 
while  the  will  produces  consciously  volitions  as  commitments,  the  will  arranges 
unconsciously volitions as dispositions by simply confirming the behavioural persistance of 
subjective habits, aptitudes and inclinations. Now, the will is free in willing the first set of 
volitions; while is not free in willing the second (the will just deliberates that if such and 
such is the situation, then such and such should be the subject's behaviour). As regards to 
this  distinction,  I  claim  that  FREEDOM3=def does  not  apply  to  all  kind  of  agency  human 
subjects ordinary experience; being its extension limited to volitions as commitments. 
In  this  light  hesitations,  conflicting  volitions  and  non  conflicting  volitions  are  fights 
between a volition as commitment (which appears to the subject soundly expressive of her 
will) and a volition as disposition (which appears to the subject unsoundly expressive or 
basically  inexpressive  of  her  will).  As  a  consequence,  the  assumption  of  II.(f)  in  the 
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argument is faulty: agency theorists fail to identify the right exercises of free will in support 
to FREEDOM3=def. Then, the soundness of II.(g) is not a case against FREEDOM3=def.   
With  all  these  considerations  in  mind  the  problem  of  freedom  can  now  be  newly 
formulated. The appeal to common sense experiences of acting reveals to be disappointing 
since the most part of human agency probably concerns just the fight between volitions as 
commitments and volitions as dispositions, which does not appear the field within which 
human  beings  exercise  their  freedom.  Nonetheless,  human  beings  possibly  have  an 
experience of their  freedom in actualizing volitions  as commitments.  The attribution of 
freedom to mankind, then, is to be defended by the right identification of cases wherein the 
will produces volitions as commitments.
In  my  opinion  Berkeley's  theory  of  agency  provides  a  preliminary  point  of  departure 
towards a palatable understanding of the topic. Indeed, his account makes justice both to 
the claim that human beings commonly act by custom and to the claim that human beings 
can be free in acting.  Naturally, I'm not saying that Berkeley offers us a consistent and 
complete theory of freedom: I simply hold that, although he does not deal with freedom and 
agency by the adequate conceptual distinctions and the sound systematic architecture which 
should be required (for example, Berkeley does not develop a persuasive account of the 
different kind of volitions), the intuitions on which his embryonic version of TPA relies 
deserve to be worked out into a consistent and complete theory.
III.
In order to set forth Berkeley's embryonic approach to TPA, I will begin with focusing on a 
passage (Alc., I.11, p. 40) wherein Berkeley briefly sketches out a theory of agency. In my 
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opinion the  text  is  very relevant  because  Berkeley does not approach the topic from a 
systematic point of view: since he treats  a practical case of agency, the passage shows 
Berkeley’s conception at work.  
The matter at issue concerns whether a technical method in knowledge is useful or useless. 
Alciphron  and  Lysicles  defend  the  claim  that  in  knowledge  “method,  exactness  and  
industry are a disavantage”. Refuting academical methods of inquiry, based on sistematical 
reading, formal arguing and disciplined meditation on antinomic views, freethinkers believe  
free conversation or speaking to be the most suitable mean to achieve the truth. In support 
to this, Alciphron refers to the difference between the  Dutch and the  Italian manner in 
painting.  According  to  his  opinion,  while  the  former  consists  in  applying  established 
techniques to picture exactly the objects represented, the latter appears to be the outcome of 
a free inspiration relying on emotions, intuitions, and enthusiasm. That is, he holds that the 
example  highlights  how  proceeding  freely  warrants  better  results  than  proceeding 
methodically. Consequently, he invites Euphranor to apply this consideration to the claim 
he is defending. Berkeley’s spokesman replies as follows:
…  did  those  great  Italian masters  begin  and proceed  in  their  art  without  any  choice  of 
methods or subject, and always draw with the same ease and freedom? Or did they observe 
some method, beginning with simple elementary parts, … which they drew with great pains 
and care, … in order to draw them correctly, and so proceeding with patience and industry, 
till after a considerable lenght of time they arrived at the free masterly manner you speak of 
(Alc., I.11, p. 40)?
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Opposing the attitude of freethinkers to hold that  free manner  is  the ability to produce 
actions floating arbitrarily by association of ideas or feelings20, Euphranor suggests that the 
exercise of human agency requires to acquire behavioral automatisms. 
A line of reasoning justifies the soundness of this suggestion: human beings have natural 
inclinations (as sensations, passions, fears, appetites, aversions and desires) which direct 
them to pursue different ends. These inclinations oppose and fight the one to the other, 
being the one strongest at a certain moment and weaker at another, the other weaker at a 
certain moment and strongest at another. Consequently, human beings are naturally driven 
to behave in a way or another in reason of the random result of the fight among their natural 
inclinations, insofar as they follow these21. But, human beings are something more than 
natural animals: they are moral agents, that is, they have rationality and judgement in order 
to  direct  their  behaviours.  Nonetheless,  their  rationality  and  judgement  have  the 
unavoidable tendency to fall into a theoretical and practical failure. As to the theoretical 
side: human reason is constantly defeated by faith, prejudice and unjustified beliefs22. As to 
the  practical  side:  human reason appears  unable to  subdue completely  the fight  among 
natural inclinations to the actualization of the decrees of the will23. In consequence of this 
double  failure,  Berkeley  rejects  a  conception  of  deliberation  as  an  exclusively  rational 
balance among moral reasons: 
Whatever may be the effect of pure theory upon certain select spirits, of a peculiar make, or in 
20 See Lysicles’ answer to Euphranor’s question whether there is any freethinking method or course of studies  
in place to the traditional ones: “None but an easy free conversation, which takes in everything that offers, 
without any rule or design” (Alc., I.11., p. 39).
21 See Alc., III.5, p. 97.
22 See Alc., VI.19, p. 211.
23 See Alc., V.5, p. 146; V.19, pp. 158-159.
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some other part of the world; I do verily think that in this country of ours, reason, religion,  
law, are all together little enough to subdue the outward to the inner man (Alc., III.12, p. 107).
Now,  phenomenal  evidences  as  hesitations,  conflicting  volitions  and  non  conflicting 
volitions seems to me reasons in support to Berkeley's account of human moral life. In light  
of the distinction among the two basic sets of volitions I have introduced in the previous 
section,  I  claim  that,  while  the  subject  ordinary  performs  actions  being  driven  by 
persistently  prevailing  volitions  as  dispositions  (in  Berkeley's  terminology:  natural 
inclinations),  whenever  her  actions  result  relevant  for  the  self-ascription  of  control  or 
authorship  over  these,  the  subject  performs  actions  by  means  of  an  effort  to  win  the 
persistently  prevailing  volitions  as  dispositions  by  her  volitions  as  commitments  (in 
Berkeley's terminology: rationality and judgement). 
If this is the case, this picture of human agency conflicts with the assumptions (c), (d), and 
(e) by which the contemporary debate on freedom characterizes the nature of volitions and 
actions. Indeed:
REFUTATION OF (c): the volition forming process is not to be referred to the subject only, 
since volitions as commitments are framed by the interaction of reasons as moral 
judgements, unjustified beliefs as prejudices and natural inclinations as volitions as 
dispositions.  Moral  judgements  are  in  the  subject's  complete  control,  whereas 
prejudices and volitions as dispositions are not. The same holds for the action forming 
process, since either the performance of an action ordinary depends on the exercise of 
volitions as dispositions, which does not result in the subject's complete control, or 
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the performance of an action relevant for the self-ascription of control (or authorship) 
over this, depends on the effort  to subdue volitions as dispositions to volitions as 
commitments, which is not always the case.
REFUTATION OF (d): the volition forming process and the action production process are 
not linear processes, since in both of them occur motives different in kind (moral 
judgements, prejudices, volitions as dispositions). Consequently, these can not count 
in the processes by their absolute weight or force (for example, a strong judgement as 
you shall not use violence to your lover could win a contrary weaker judgement as 
you could use violence to your lover if she makes you get angry, even if it could not 
be able to subdue a natural inclinations to wrath and violence).
REFUTATION OF (e): the volition forming process and the action forming process do not 
occur instantaneously since they are both the result of temporal interactions among 
reasons  different  in  kind  (for  example,  a  subject  naturally  inclined  to  wrath  and 
violence could possibly be convinced that she should not use violence to her lover, so 
that she could possibly fight among her natural inclinations during a fit of anger in 
order to subdue these).
Berkeley's appeal to the acquisition of behavioural automatisms matters here. Given that 
human  pratical  life  reveals  to  be  subjected  to  the  random  swinging  among  different 
purposes,  the  agent  is  exposed  to  the  risk  of  wandering  through  the  achievements  of 
heteronomic ends,  being driven from the one to  the other  by the fight  among motives 
different in kind. The only mean the subject has to exercise control (or authorship) over her 
actions seems then to conform her behaviour to a customary performance of sets of actions 
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whose actualization is made possible by the acquisition of their execution by training24. 
That is, the subject need to model her behaviour by making her volitions as commitments 
to  lead  the  processes  by  which  persistently  volitions  as  dispositions  are  established, 
reinforced and dismantled.
For  example,  consider  the  case  Alciphron  and  Euphranor  deal  with  in  Alciphron I.11. 
Suppose a painter intends to portray a beatiful woman. In order to accomplish this task she 
should  be  able  to  perform  determined  actions:  handling  paintbrushes,  mixing  primary 
colours, using degrees of colour to achieve perspectival effects, and so on. If this is the 
case, she should then be able to apply these tecniques in picturing hands, picturing faces, 
picturing legs, and so on.  And again, if she can adequately picture different parts of the 
human body, she should be able to vary them in different postures. Each of these steps is 
customary acquired by performing several resembling instances of the same action, to such 
an  extent  that,  whenever  the  action  should  be  performed  again,  then  the  action  is 
automatically performed. This acquisition is to be seen as the establishment, reinforcement 
and dismantling of volitions as dispositions (consisting in natural inclinations towards the 
exercution of a given performance of handling paintbrushes, of mixing primary colours, of 
using degrees of colour to achieve perspectival  effects,  of picturing hands,  of picturing 
faces, of picturing legs, and so on) by volitions as commitments (consisting in judgements 
such as I will determinately handling paintbrushes so and so, I will determinately mixing  
primary  colours  so  and  so, I  will  determinately  using  degrees  of  colour  to  achieve  
perspectival effects so and so, I will picturing hands so and so, I will picturing faces so and 
so,  I will picturing legs so and so, and so on). Finally, since the painter controls all these 
24 See Alc., III.9, p. 98; III.12, p. 106. Bertini (2010), p. 314; Jaffro (2003), pp. 163-167.
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particular actions, she appears able to apply any of them in portraying the beatiful woman.
Summarizing, a berkeleian like account of free agency consists in the conjunction of five 
different intuitions: 
Ia) Human beings are free because they have a control or authorship over some of 
their actions;
Ib)  The  mean  by  which  human  beings  exercise  control  or  authorship  over  their 
relevant actions is their will;
Ic) The will is not able to exercise an absolute power to produce volitions and direct 
the subject's agency, because, given that the practical life is a fight between moral 
reasons, prejudices and natural inclinations, volitions as dispositions ordinary seem 
strongest than volitions as commitments;
Id) The will does exercise a relative power to actualize its volitions as commitments 
by making them to lead the customary acquisition of habits by training;
Ie) Human beings are free in their behaviour iff the exercise of their agency by their 
volitions  as  dispositions  is  the  result  of  an  intentional  customary  acquisition  by 
training of behavioural automatisms.
Since from the assumptions of (Ia), (Ib), (Ic), (Id) and (Ie) follows that (c), (d) and (e) should 
be rejected, a berkeleian like account of free agency appears to be irreducible to any of the 
views (1), (2), (3), and (4) the contemporary debate on freedom admits. That is to say, since 
Berkeley's  approach to TPA relies  on a characterization of volition and action which is 
alternative to that assumed by (1), (2), (3), and (4), a berkeleian like account of free agency 
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essentially differs from each of the contemporary views on freedom.
Indeed,  consider  libertarianism.  Both  the  libertarian  theorist  and  Berkeley  are  agency 
theorists.  Nonetheless,  the  first  holds,  while  the  second  denies,  that  the  will  exercises 
control over the subject's relevant actions by having the power to choose among alternative 
possibilities and by having the power to actualize her choice. That is, the libertarian relies 
on an optimistic account of the causal powers of the will; Berkeley on a pessimistic one.
Let's now move to hard-determinism. Both the hard determinist theorist and Berkeley claim 
that  human  agency  is  ordinary  determined  by  external  constraints  on  the  subject. 
Nonetheless,  the  first  holds,  while  the  second  denies,  that  this  suffices  to  reject  the 
attribution of freedom to mankind. That is, the hard determinist thinks of freedom in terms 
of autonomy in willing and acting; Berkeley in terms of control over the process leading to 
choice and execution of actions. 
As to compatibilism. Both the compatibilist theorist and Berkeley hold that a deterministic 
approach to  human  agency  can  be  made consistent  with  the  attribution  of  freedom to 
mankind.  Nonetheless,  the  first  holds,  while  the  second  denies,  that  the  ascription  of 
authored  actions  to  a  given  subject  by  other  subjects  is  enough  to  attribute  moral 
responsibility to her. That is, the compatibilist assumes that the attribution of freedom to 
human  beings  is  justified  by  common social  practices;  Berkeley  that  the  attribution  of 
freedom  to  human  beings  requires  they  to  be  metaphysically  responsible  for  their 
behaviour. 
Finally, I come to skepticism. Both the skeptic theorist and Berkeley think that any theory 
being a version of (1), (2), and (3) should be rejected. Nonetheless, the first holds, while the 
second denies, that, given the rejection of (1), (2), and (3), no theory can adequately grasp 
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the notion of human freedom. That is, the skeptic is ready to argue for the lack of soundness 
of any speculation on freedom; Berkeley for the soundness of his own one.
Consequently, a berkeleian like account for free agency appears a case for the assumption 
of (C2). Now, relying on Berkeley's account of moral life and his intuitions about customary 
agency by acquisition of behavioural automatism, I will sketch an explanation of acting as a  
theory of procedural  agency. This theory understands the performance of actions  by an 
agent  in  terms of  automatical  performance of customary acquired subactions.  I  think a 
provisional version of TPA can be captured by the following propositions25:
Requirements for acquisition of behavorial automatisms
R1) An agent acquires performing any determined action by custom;
R2) An  agent  acquires  how  to  perform  any  determined  action  as  a  determined 
instance of a determined type of action;
R3) An agent is able to perform an action iff she has acquired to perform that action.
Definition
For any action  ai, subactions of  ai are all instances  a1,  b2, …,   kk+a of  A,  B, …,  K 
whose performance is required for performing ai.
25 Let a1, a2, …,  ai, b1, b2, …,  bj, …, k1, k2, …,  kk+a stand for instances of types of action. Then a1, a2, …,  ai 
are elements of A, b1, b2, …,  bj are elements of B, …, k1, k2, …,  kk+a are elements of K, where A {all a-type 
actions}, B {all b-type actions}, …,  K {all k-type actions}. And again, suppose x, y, z, are agents. Then A1(x) 
stands for x acquires performing a1, B2(x) for x acquires performing b2, …, Kk+a(x) for x acquires performing 
kk+a; Ca1(x) stands for x acquires performing a1 by custom, Cb2(x) for x acquires performing b2 by custom, …, 
Ckk+a(x) for x acquires performing kk+a by custom; Pa1(x) stands for x performs a1, Pb2(x) for x performs b2, …, 
Pkk+a(x) for x performs Kk+a.
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Principle of performance of actions
PPA) An agent performs an action ai performing groups of subactions of ai.
Theory of procedural agency
TPA1) An agent performs an action ai iff she has acquired to perform the subactions 
of ai.
TPA2) If an agent performing the action ai performs the subactions b2, …., kk+a, then b2 
is a particular instance of b-type action, …., kk+a of k-type action.
TPA3)  An  agent  performs  an  action  ai performing  groups  of  customary  acquired 
subactions, which are particular instances of determined type of actions26. 
In my opinion TPA is the most promising approach to freedom since, while  the theory 
grants that human agency has a predominant deterministic feature, it rightly identifies the 
26 
Requirements:
R1: ∀ai,x [Ai(x) ⊃ Ca1(x)] 
R2: ∀ai,x [Ai(x) ⊃ [Ai(x) ∈ A]]
R3: ∀ai,x [Pa1(x) ⊃ Ai(x)]
Definition:
SUBACTION=DEF ∀ai, bj,kk+a,x {Pb2(x), …, Pkk+a(x) are subactions of ai iff {Pa1(x) ⊃ [Pb2(x) & … & Pkk+a(x)]} 
Principle of performance of actions:
PPA: ∀ ai,bj,kk+a,x {Pa1(x) ⊃ [Pb2(x) & … & Pkk+a(x)]}
Main propositions of TPA:
TPA1: 
1) From R1 and R3: ∀ai,x [Pa1(x) ⊃ Ca1(x)] 
2) From (1) and PPA: ∀ ai,bj,kk+a,x {Pa1(x) ⊃ [Cb2(x) & … & Ckk+a(x)]}
TPA2:
3) From R2 and R3: ∀ai,x {Pa1(x) ⊃ [A1(x) ∈ A]}
4) From (3) and PPA: ∀ ai,bj,kk+a,x {Pa1(x) ⊃ [Pb2(x) ∈ B & … & Pkk+a(x) ∈ K]}
TPA3: 
5) From (2) and (4): ∀ ai,bj,kk+a,x {Pa1(x) ⊃ [Cb2(x) ∈ B & … & Ckk+a(x) ∈ K]
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class of phenomena which makes justice to the idea of dealing with freedom in terms of the 
exercise of a free agency. That is, TPA finds phenomenal evidences in support to the claim 
that  human  beings  are  free  in  exercising  free  agency:  insofar  as  subjects  model  their 
behaviour by educating themselves to perform customary behavioural automatisms, they 
freely commit themselves to act determinately in the way they like.
What matters in TPA is that it  enables the theorist to account for the claim that human 
beings have immanent causal powers within a transeunt causation realm. Consider a subject 
experiencing a given state of the world. Normally, she answers environmental stimuli by 
her volitions as dispositions. That is to say, the subject reacts to the situation the actual state 
of  the  world  presents  her  by  her  natural  tendencies  to  perform  the  action  so  and  so 
whenever the situation she experiences is so and so. Now, both the environmental stimuli 
and  the  subject's  reaction  to  these  are  a  clear  case  of  transeunt  causation  processes. 
Nonetheless,  the  subject's  reaction  is  a  customary performance of  acquired  behavioural 
automatism.  Immanent  causation  by  the  subject  intervenes  here:  the  acquisition  of 
behavioural automatism is the establishment, reinforcement and dismantling of persistently 
prevailing volitions as dispositions. That is, human will models the subject's reaction to a 
given  state  of  the  world  by  her  volitions  as  commitments.  Consequently,  the  subject's 
reaction  to  a  given  state  of  the  world does  not  originate  from any transeunt  causation 
process, being the result  of the effort  by the will  to subdue volitions as dispositions to 
volitions as commitments. Conclusion follows: the more the subject conforms her volitions 
as dispositions to her volitions as commitments, the more the subject exercises control over 
her behaviour; namely, the subject exercises immanent causation powers.
Naturally,  this  does  not  mean  that  the  preliminary  version  of  TPA is  a  sufficient  and 
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complete account of freedom: it looks more like a starting point than a definitive theory. 
Indeed, in order to accomplish the task there is a great deal of problems that requires to be 
faced. In my final section I will briefly outline what seems to me in need to be settled.
IV.
Problems  for  TPA consist  in  giving  a  sustained  theory  of  the  will  addressing  mainly 
metaphysical concerns. This is the way I see this matter. 
TPA should  be  able  to  expand its  fundamental  intuition  on  the  way the  will  exercises 
control over the subject's agency.  That is, it is necessary to provide a detailed account of 
the  manner  by which  volitions  as  commitments  and volitions  as  dispositions  originate. 
Furthermore, the account should show how it is possible that volitions as commitments lead 
the establishment, the reinforcement and the dismantling of volitions as dispositions. 
Once this account is given, in order to overcome antinomic reasoning, TPA should reject 
(1), (2), (3), and (4) with ad hoc arguments relying on its main propositions. The same 
holds for any version of the regressum rationi argument or the luck principle argument. 
The first argument runs as follows27:
IV.a) When a subject either will or acts, she either determinately will or determinately 
acts;
IV.b) Therefore, when a subject will or acts, she either will or acts given a determined 
situation;
IV.c) That is, given the determined situation, the subject will or acts reacting to the 
27 G.Strawson (1994) names Basic Argument a particular case of the regressum rationi argument.
44
determined situation;
IV.d) Now, the subject will or acts being either free or not in exercising control over 
her volitions or actions;
IV.e) The possibility that the subject is not free is not the case for the vindication of 
the claim that human being are free in exercising free agency; 
IV.f) Consequently, suppose she is free because she reacts exercising control over her 
volitions or actions;
IV.g) Then, she has some motives in her control for determining herself to behave in a 
determinate manner;
IV.h) A motive determining a subject to behave in a determinate manner is in her 
control, iff the subject is committed to behave in a determinate manner;
IV.i) A subiect is committed to behave in a determinate manner for some reasons;
IV.j) Consequently, if the subiect will or acts exercising control over her volitions or 
actions, then she has some reasons committing herself to behave in a determinate 
manner;
IV.k)  Now,  if  the  subject  has  some  reasons  committing  herself  to  behave  in  a 
determinate manner, either she holds justifiably those reasons or not; 
IV.l) If she does not hold justifiably those reasons, then the subject has not any actual 
reason to hold those reasons;
IV.m) Consequently, the subject will or acts without having any actual control over 
her volitions or actions;
IV.n) On the contrary suppose she has some second order reasons to hold those first 
order reasons;
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IV.o) Then she should have some other third order reasons in order to justified those 
second order reasons, and so on;
IV.p)  Finally,  in  having some higher  order  reasons  justifying  all  her  lower  order 
reasons, any subject falls in an infinite regressum rationi;
IV.r)  Now, given that  human subjects  are  finite  beings,  they  can  not  perform an 
infinite  regressum rationi  in  order  to justify those reasons which commit  them to 
behave in a determinate manner;
IV.s) Therefore, the subject can not will or act exercising control over her volitions or 
actions.
The second argument is someway related to the first  argument.  Suppose that a theorist 
wishes to defeat the regressum rationi argument by denying that (IV.a), (IV.b), and (IV.c) 
are  sound.  Therefore,  it  should  follow  that  (IV.t)  the  subject  will  or  acts  being  
undeterminately free to will or act otherwise than what she actually does. Let's assume the 
following principle28:
LUCK PRINCIPLE=def If an action is undetermined at time t, then its happening rather than 
not happening at t would be a matter of chance or luck, and so it could not be a free 
and responsible action.
Then the argument follows:
28 Kane (1999), p. 217.
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IV.t) the subject will or acts being undeterminately free to will or act otherwise than 
what she actually does;
IV.u) The LUCK PRINCIPLE is the case;
IV.w) The subject is not free in either willing or acting.
If all these purposes be achieved, TPA would result a consistent and complete account of 
freedom. I think much work is required to this end. Nonetheless, TPA appears enabling 
theorists to achieve the goal of vindicating the idea that human beings are metaphysically 
free in a very promising way.
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